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CASENOTES
upheld despite its impairment of protected commercial expression will de-
pend upon whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the ban
on the display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs is effective in reducing a sub-
stantial incidence of panic selling which' is attributable to the signs. If such
evidence can be established, the ban may be upheld since Linmark affirms
that common sense differences in commercial speech, based upon the fac-
tual context, may give rise to a different constitutional result. However, as
appears more likely in view of the difficulty in demonstrating the effective-
ness of the ordinances, the holding in Linmark that obstructions to the
communication of truthful and legitimate commercial information are for-
bidden by the first amendment suggests that communities will be compelled
to develop alternatives that do not abridge constitutionally protected ex-
pression.
MICHAEL M. HOGAN
Implied Warranty of Habitability in Federal Housing Projects: Alexander
v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development'-
Riverhouse Tower Apartments (Riverhouse) is a housing complex consist-
ing of two twelve-story buildings constructed with a mortgage insured by
the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). 2 The mortgagee defaulted on the loan and HUD acquired posses-
sion and managed the property after foreclosure. 3
By the time HUD foreclosed, Riverhouse had fallen into a "deplorable
condition":
The project was infested with roaches and vermin; elevators
were often inoperable; security was poor; hot water and heat
were inadequate or non-existent; the buildings were often
flooded; lighting was poor in the narrow hallways which were
often cluttered with garbage; plumbing was deficient, and some
tenants had electrical problems. 4
HUD chose to terminate the project rather than to make repairs. 5 Once the
project was vacant, HUD returned security deposits to those tenants who
were current in their rent but applied the amount to the balance due from
any tenant who was in arrears'
Tenants brought suit for the return of withheld security deposits on
the theory that HUD had breached an implied warranty of habitability in
' 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W, 3485 (U.S. Jan. 31,
1978) (No. 77-874).
2 1d. at 167. The mortgage was insured under 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1970). This sec-
tion is designed to assist private industry in providing housing for low income families
through subsidizing and insuring mortgages made by private lenders.
3 555 F.2d at 167. HUD's authority to foreclose property in default and subsequently to
manage such property is derived from 12 U.S.C. H 1713(k), 1713(1) (1970).
1 555 F.2d at 167-68.
5 /d. at 167.
6 1d. at 168-69.
343
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
renting substandard housing.' They contended that their duty to pay rent
was dependent on HUD's duty to maintain the premises in a habitable
condition.° Because HUD had breached that duty, plaintiffs contended that
their duty to pay rent was wholly relieved and that HUD therefore had
wrongfully retained their security deposits."
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
granted the government's motion for summary judgment.'° On appeal the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and
HELD: There is no implied warranty of habitability in leases of public
housing units owned by HUD."
In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit noted the judicial trend
in some states toward implying warranties of habitability based on the ra-
tionale that the common law rule absolving the lessor from all responsibility
to repair had never been intended to apply to urban residential leases."
The court observed, however, that while the federal courts might be
guided by decisions of state courts, the rule of decision is federal.' 3 The
court then distinguished the state decisions on the basis that they involved
leases in the private sector." In contrast, the court pointed out that HUD
housing is constructed to effectuate the national policy of remedying the
acute housing shortage by providing decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for
families of low income." The implication of a warranty of habitability, the
court reasoned, would be tantamount to a guarantee that congressional
goals are being met. The court believed that such a guarantee was best left
to Congress and accordingly concluded that it was improper for the court
to imply a warranty of habitability in federally owned housing."
The significance of the Alexander decision lies in its refusal to apply to
the federal government a development of tenants' rights which has been
7 1d. These plaintiffs were joined by several other plaintiff-tenants of Riverhouse in
seeking relocation benefits as provided by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Prop-
erty Acquisitions Act (URA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601 et seq. (1970). Plaintiffs argued that they were
"displaced persons" within the meaning of the URA. Under this Act, a displaced person is one
who is forced to move or vacate real property because of a program or project undertaken by
a federal agency. The statute has been interpreted to refer only to the construction of a new
federal project and not as the court concluded, to the termination of an existing federal proj-
ect. 555 F.2d at 168.70, citing Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. La. 1974) and Caramico
v. HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974). A petition for certiorari was filed on this issue. 46
U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Jan. 31, 1978) (No. 77-874). This note will not consider this issue.
"See 555 F.2d at 168.
Id.
" Id. The opinion of the district court is unpublished.
" Id.
" Id. at 170.
'' Id. at 170-71.
"Id. at 171.
' 5 1d. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970) states the congressional purpose of the National Housing
It is declared to be the policy of the United States ... to remedy the un-
safe and insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and
sanitary dwellings for families of low income, in urban, rural nonfarm and In-
dian areas, that are injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens of
the Nation ....




gaining acceptance in state courts and legislatures." For many poor people,
HUD housing is the only affordable alternative to unsafe and insanitary
housing conditions in the private sector. An implied warranty of habitabil-
ity would place HUD under an affirmative obligation to maintain leased
premises in a habitable condition and would give tenants contractual rights
such as rescission, modification and retention of rent upon breach of that
obligation.
This note will first discuss why the fashioning of a landlord-tenant
rule is determined by application of federal common law and will then con-
sider the process by which federal common law is developed by the federal
judiciary. Next, the notion of an implied warranty of habitability will be
examined in order to determine whether the development of a federal
common law rule of implied warranty is consistent with United States' pol-
icy objectives. It will then be submitted that the Alexander court mis-
construed the nature of an implied warranty of habitability and in so doing
failed to adopt the proper rule to be applied in this case.
1. FEDERAL COMMON LAW
By finding that the rule of decision regarding the implication of a
warranty of habitability in HUD housing is federal," the Seventh Circuit
implied), recognized that it was fashioning a rule of federal common law.
Although the Supreme Court in its landmark decision in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkin,0 9 held that there is no federal general common law applicable
in federal courts, 2 ° there is nevertheless a federal common law which gov-
erns when state law is inapplicable. 2 ' Such circumstances exist whenever a
"The following fourteen courts have held that there is an implied warranty of' habita-
bility in residential leases: Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 4'28, 462 P.2d 470, 472 (1969); Ja-
vins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970); Kline v. Burns, 1 1 1
N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (1971); Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op.2d 459, 461, 289
N.E.2d 919, 923 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1972); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280
N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (lowa 1972); Boston Housing
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83
Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973); Derr v. Cangemi, 66 Pa. D. & C. 2d 162, 175 (1974); Green v. Superior Court 10
Cal. 3d 616, 629, 517 P.2d 1168, 1176, 111  Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (1974); Steele v. Latimer, 214
Kan. 329, 336, 521 P.2d 304, 309-10 (1974); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford,—Ind. App.
—, 349 N.E.2d 744, 764 (1976). Not all state courts, however, have chosen to find im-
plied warranties of habitability in residential leases. Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343. 349-50,
294 A.2d 321, 325 (1972) (no implied warranty of habitability in Connecticut leases); Blackwell
v. Del Bosco,—Colo. —, 558 P.2d 563, 565 (1976) (implication of a warranty left to
the legislature). The following three states have passed legislation creating a warranty of
habitability; New York: N.Y. REAL. PRO/'. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1977); Minnesota:
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1077); Michigan: Mtcti. STAT. ANN. § 26.1109 (Cal-
laghan 1970). Eleven states have passed the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
section 2.104 of which creates a warranty of habitability in residential leases. The states which
have passed the act are Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia. UnifOrm Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 7 UNI-
FORM LAWS ANN. 400 (Supp. 1978).
' 8 555 F.2d at 170.
19 304 U.S, 64 (1938).
"Id. at 78.
" See Hinderlander v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938) (whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between two states is a
345
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federal court is free to decide for itself the rule of decision to be applied. 22
This generally will occur when the courts are called upon to resolve prob-
lems arising from the operation of a federal enactment 23 or to decide fed-
eral questions 24
 where the relevant federal statute, if any, is silent on a par-
ticular issue.25
 The federal courts also are empowered to create rules neces-
sary to fill in the interstices of congressional statutory schemes. 26 By fash-
ioning rules in such a manner, federal courts create federal common law.
In the creation of a federal common law rule, a court may in-
corporate the state rule as the federal rule within that state," or,
alternatively, may create a uniform federal rule," Where the state rule is
question of federal common law). Hinderlander was decided on the same day and by the same
Justice—Justice Brandeis—as Erie. See also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 468-70, (1942) (Jackson, J. concurring). See generally C. WIUGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS, § 60 (3d ed. 1976); Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law:" Competence and
Discretion in The Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957);
Hill, The Law Making Power of the Federal Courts. Constitutional Preemption, 67 CoLum. L. REV.
1024 (1967); Note, Rules of Decision in Non-Diversity Cases, 69 YALE L.J. 1428 (1960); Note, The
Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969).
22 WRIGHT,SUpra note 21, at 279.
"E.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lihcoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (labor relations
covered by federal statute); Clearfield Tali( Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (is-
suance of commercial paper by federal government).
"E.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (apportionment of interstate waters);
DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (scope of a federal right); United States v. Standard
Oil, 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (federal fiscal policy).
D'Oench, Duhme Sc Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
" Mishkin, supra note 21, at 800.
22 See United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241 (1960) (state law governing di-
vestiture of federal tax liens utilized); Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958) (cred-
itors' rights determined by state law in federal income tax dispute); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351
U.S. 570, 580, 581 (1956) (state law adopted to define children under federal copyright act);
Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1939) (state law adopted as
to whether state must pay interest on taxes wrongfully assessed against Indians); Bumb v.
United States, 276 F.2d 729, 736 (9th Cir. 1960) (state definition of chattel mortgage adopted
in private contract dispute with the Small Business Administration). Even though it is de-
termined as a general matter that state law will constitute the rule of decision on a given issue,
the federal courts are free to scrutinize the particular rule of any state in order to ensure that
the state's rule is not inconsistent with federal policy. Where such inconsistency is present, the
federal courts are empowered to fashion an independent federal rule. The Supreme Court
suggested this in DeSylva where it noted that it would not adopt a state's definition of a child if
it went beyond permissible variations of ordinary usage. 351 U.S. at 581.
Thus it is possible to have a situation where state law is applied as to controversies in
some states and an independent rule is fashioned in other states to govern the same type of
situation. This is the case as to measure of damages for wrongful death under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (F.T.C.A.), 28 U.S.C. 2674 (1970). Under judicial construction of that Act,
local law is adopted for all states except those states that provide for only punitive damages in
wrongful death actions. Punitive damages may not be assessed against the United States under
the F.T.C.A. Id. See Mishkin, supra note 21, at 806 n.33; Massachusetts Bonding Co. v, United
States, 352 U.S. 128, 133 (1956).
" Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 381-82
(1969) (uniform rule necessary for resolution of labor disputes); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (uniform rule needed regarding government's is-
suance of commercial paper); United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d
380, 383-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) (uniform rule necessary to govern
breach of mortgage agreement with United States); Keydata Corp. v. United States, 504 F.2d
1115, 1124 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (uniform rule required as to lessor's obligation to deliver possession
to United States). 946
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incorporated as the federal rule, it applies not through the lawmaking pow-
ers of the state, but rather because recognition of the state interest is not
inconsistent with federal policy." The rule thus fashioned, even though it
incorporates state law, is nevertheless federal law. 3° The state rule often is
incorporated in questions concerning real property because concepts of real
property are deeply rooted in the conditions, customs, habits and laws of
an individual state." Uniform rules, on the other hand, generally are
adopted where uniformity is needed to effectuate congressional goals,
policies or programs," or where adoption of state rules would subject the
rights, duties and obligations of the United States to uncertainty. 3 °
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States 34 is the starting point for consider-
ing federal common law development in the post-Erie era. There, the
United States brought an action against the Clearfield Trust Company for
clearing a check issued by the government which had been fraudulently
endorsed." Clearfield defended on the ground that the United States un-
reasonably delayed in giving notice of the forgery."' Under the law of the
state, the United States would have been barred from recovery." In ascer-
taining liability, the Supreme Court noted that when the United States pays
debts or disburses funds it is exercising a constitutional power and that
therefore federal and not state law should govern."' Because there was no
applicable act of Congress which was determinative, the Court was free to
fashion its own rule of law."
The Court then rejected the rule of the state noting that the United
States issues commercial paper on a vast scale in several states. 4° The Court
believed that application of the rules of the various states in which the gov-
ernment transacts business would subject the rights and duties of the
United States to exceptional uncertainty in that identical transactions would
29 Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939).
" Id. at 349-50.
" See, e.g., Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946)
(state definition of "real property" used); United States v. Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142,
144-45 (2d Cir. 1965) (state law used to define "fixtures"); Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d
729, 737-38 (9th Cir. 1960) (state law governs interpretation of chattel mortgages).
In some cases the dispute is so local in nature that the federal courts do not apply fed-
eral law but rather apply state law by its own force. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315,
320 (1877) (disposition of real property is determined by state law); United States v. 1078.27
Acres of Land, 446 F.2d 1030, 1040 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972) (state law
governs in a land title dispute).
" Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 382
(1969) (regulation of a labor dispute); Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union v. WDAY Inc.,
360 U.S. 525, 531-33 (1959) (Federal Communications Commission regulations).
33 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (issuance of commer-
cial paper by United States government); Keydata Corp. v. United States, 504 F.2d 1115 (Ct.
Cl. 1974) (government's need to know in advance what its rights are under a lease).
34 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
35 1d. at 365.
3" Id. at 366.
" Id.
33 Id. The check was drawn for services rendered to the Works Progress Administration,
a federal agency. Id. at 364.
35 1d. at 367.
A0 id.
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be subject to the laws of the several states..' A uniform rule of federal
common law was therefore fashioned by the court to resolve the liabilities
of the parties.42
For reasons similar to those enunciated in Clearfield as supporting uni-
formity, contracts with the federal government are governed by a uniform
federal common law." A lease, in addition to its real property characteris-
tics, has contractual aspects as well. 44
 This was recognized in Girard Trust
Co. v. United Staies 4' where the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that leases with the federal government are to be con-
strued, like government contracts, according to uniform rules of federal
common law. 46
 The only exception to this contractual uniformity appears
where the contract involves or defines a relationship, such as the re-
lationship to real property, which is peculiarly within the state's province to
regulate..' Thus where a lease provision is contractual in nature it will be
interpreted according to a uniform rule of federal common law." Where,
4 ' Id.
42 Id. at 370. The Court held that one who accepts a forged signature of a payee is
allowed to shift his loss to the drawee only on a clear showing that the drawee's delay in
notifying him of the forgery caused him damage. Under state law, the loss would have au-
tomatically shifted if there was unreasonable delay even if the delay did not cause the loss. Id.
"United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209 (1970); Priebe & Sons v. United States,
332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944); see
Pofcher, Choice of Law, State or Federal in Government Contracts, 12 LA L. REV. 37 (1951).
44 "[T]he landlord's duties no longer end when he delivers possession. He now provides
care and maintenance for the building.... These services are of a type usually purchased
by contract." Schoshinski, Remedies of the indigent Tenant: Proposals for Change, 54 GEO. L. REV.
519, 535 (1966). See 2 H. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 221[1], at 181 (1967); C. MOYNJLIAN. IN-
TRoDucTioN TO THE LAW OF REAL. PkorEtav 69 (2d ed. 1962).
" 149 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1945).
" Id. at 874. In holding that federal common law governs a lease executed by the
United States the Girard court quoted from United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174
(1944) where the Supreme Court stated: The validity and construction of contracts through
which the United States is exercising its constitutional functions ... present questions of fed-
eral law... ." Id. at 183, quoted in, 149 F.2d at 874 n.5 (emphasis added).
Federal courts have continued to apply federal law in construing leases to which the
United States is a party. Boccardo v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 858, 862 (N.D. Calif. 1972);
United States v. Morgan, 196 F. Supp. 345, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1961) af d 298 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1962); Keydata Corp. v. United States, 504 F.2d 1115, 1124 (Ct. Cl. 1974). Cf. American
Houses v. Schneider, 211 F.2d 881, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1954) (federal law governs rights of sub-
lessee as against lessor where United States is lessee).
" in United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), the United States sued to enforce
against a wife's property a security agreement executed by a married couple in favor of the
Small Business Administration. In allowing the defense of coverture the Supreme Court left
open the question whether the state rule applied as a matter of federal common law or by its
own force as state law. Id. at 357. The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that the parties
contracted specifically with reference to state law which allowed such a defense. Id. at 345-46.
Contractual uniformity also deferred to local property interests in Bomb v. United
States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960). There, in a suit against the Small Business Administra-
tion brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to contest the validity of certain chattel mortgages
held by the SBA, the issue was whether the validity of such mortgages should be tested by
local or federal law. In holding that the state law is to be adopted as the federal common law
rule, the Ninth Circuit noted that the states have a vital interest in the protection of local
property rights. Id. at 738.
48
 American Homes v. Schneider, 211 F.2d 881, 883 (3d Cir. 1954) (as against lessor,
sublessee of United States seeking to exercise option to renew lease has rights determined by
federal law); Boccardo v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 858, 862 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (breach of
implied covenant not to cause damage presents a question of contract construction); Keydata
348
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on the other hand, a lease provision involves the definition of a real prop-
erty interest it will be interpreted according to state rules.
Whether a particular case presents questions of contractual rights or
real property interests is well illustrated by Keydala Corp. v. United States."
In Keydata, the issue arose as to whether the United States as lessee could
rescind a lease agreement for failure of' the lessor to deliver actual posses-
sion." In holding that the lessor had to deliver actual possession, the Court
of Claims applied federal common law, citing the need for a uniform rule
so that the government could know in advance what. its rights were. 5 ' In as-
sessing the state's interest in having its Own rule apply, the court noted that
the question of the lessor's obligation to make the premises available is rel-
atively unconnected with its concern for the definition of real property."
Thus, the court concluded that the application of federal contract law in no
way would impinge upon the states' interest in defining property rights.
Applying these federal common law principles to Alexander, it is clear
that the Seventh Circuit correctly determined that, a rule regarding implied
warranties in H UD owned housing is federal. A warranty of habitability,
like the obligation to deliver possession at issue in Keydata, is a contractual
obligation dealing more with contractual rights and liabilities than with in-
terests pertaining to definitions of real property. A warranty of habitability
renders the tenant's covenant to pay rent contractually dependant upon
the landlord's covenant to deliver and maintain the premises in suitable
condition. Where the landlord breaches this covenant, the tenant is relieved
from his contractual duty to pay rent. 53 Thus, since the Alexander court was
faced with the interpretation of a government contract, it was correct in
deciding that the question of an implied warranty presented an issue of
federal common law. 54
Corp. v. United States, 504 F.2d 1115, 1123 (Ct., CI. 1974) (obligation to deliver possession to
tenants found to be a contractual requirement rather than a property interest).
42 504 F.2d 1115 (Ct. CI. 1974).
"Id. at 1117. The rule of the state, obligating the lessor to deliver only the right to
possession, is in effect in a minority of jurisdictions. The rule that the landlord must deliver
actual possession is the law of the majority. 1 AMERICAN LAW of PROPERTY § 3.37, at 249-52
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
s' 504 F.2d at 1124. The court stressed the necessity of a uniform rule, noting that.
there were several jurisdictions in which it had not been established which rule applied. In
these jurisdictions, the court reasoned, the government would either have to litigate the point
or take a chance that its position was correct. Id.
52 Id.
52 1 AMERICAN' LAW 01- PROPERTY § 3.45, at 35-36 (A.j. Casner ed. Supp. 1976).
" 555 F.2d at 170-71. The application of federal law does not preclude a finding that
the United States is in breach of a contractual term. The United States, like any private in-
dividual, may be held liable for breach of contract. 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) (1970) provides
that:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of:
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding
$10,000 in amount, founded ... upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases
not sounding in tort.
In interpreting government contracts, the United States is not in a preferred position.
Contracts between the government and private individuals are construed as if they were con-
tracts between two private parties. S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 564 (1946); Dar-
lington, Inc. v. Federal Housing Adm., 142 F. Supp. 341, 351 (E.D.S.C. 1956), reed on other
grounds, 352 U.S. 977 (1957).
349
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Despite the fact that the Alexander court correctly determined that the
rule to apply was federal, the court sidestepped any analysis of the reasons
for or against the establishment of an implied warranty as the federal
common law rule. Instead, the court indicated that it would not decide the
issue because the establishment of such a warranty was a matter of congres-
sional, rather than judicial, action. By failing to reach the merits, the court
tacitly denied its power to make law in this area and thus did not consider
fully its role as an expositor of federal common law.
Federal courts have the ability to develop common law rules in con-
troversies which arise out of a contractual relationship between private in-
dividuals and the federal government. 55 Leases with the federal govern-
ment have been held to create a contractual relationship between the par-
ties; a warranty of habitability is an implied term of such a lease which de-
fines contractual rights and liabilities within that relationship. Hence the
Alexander court should have considered, but did not, the fashioning of a uni-
form federal common law rule in this area."
II. FASHIONING A FEDERAL RULE OF DECISION
In fashioning rules of federal common law, the federal courts turn to
the traditional methods, techniques and source material of the common
law. 57
 These materials have included federal general common law de-
Nor does the application of federal law preclude finding an implied term in leases with
the United States. Implied terms have long been read into government contracts to create lia-
bility as if the term were incorporated into the contract by express language. United States v.
Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136-37 (1918) (United States impliedly warrants that plans it provides
are sound); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 53, 65-66 (1877) (implied obligation to
treat property so as to avoid injury); Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529,
532 (2d Or. 1958) (United States as bailee impliedly promised to redeliver goods to lawful
owner); City of Philadelphia v. Page. 363 F. Supp. 148, 154 (E.D. Pa. 1973), motion to vacate
judgment denied, 373 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (implied warranty of habitability in the sale
of HUD housing); Luria Bros. & Co. v. United States, 369 F.2d 701, 708 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (im-
plied obligation that neither party would hinder or delay the other); Wunderlich Contracting
Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 956, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (United States implicitly warrants that if
its plans are followed, the contractor will be able to complete the project).
5 ' See text at notes 43-52 supra.
56 This note suggests that a uniform federal common law rule is appropriate here be-
cause a contract with the federal government is involved. Arguably, an implied warranty af-
fects a real property interest and for this reason the federal courts should not apply a uniform
rule but rather should incorporate the state rule as the federal rule. This may be done so long
as the rule incorporated is not inconsistent with federal policy. See, e.g., DeSylva v. Ballentine,
351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352
(1939). By the time Alexander was decided, Indiana had judicially created an implied warranty
of habitability in residential leases. Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, — Ind. App. —, —,
349 N.E.2d 744, 764 (1976). Thus plaintiffs would have prevailed on this issue.
57
 D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring). See generally Hill, The Law Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitu-
tional Preemption, 67 Cot.usi. L. REV. 1024, 1069 (1967). Professor Hill states that the common
law is applied even though the federal courts lack a reception statute. Reception statutes,
passed by many states, adopted English common law developments until a certain date as state
law. See Murray v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. 62 F. 24, 28 (N.D. Iowa 1894), aff'd, 92 F. 868 (8th
Cir. 1899) (common law explicitly adopted).
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veloped before the Erie decision," laws of the states," English common
law, 6° the intent and policy manifested in congressional legislation," Re-
statement of Property,62 principles of equity and convenience," and "the
best in modern decision and discussion." 64 In sum, the courts have been
free to look to a multitude of sources in determining the best rule of deci-
sion in a particular case. Specifically, as applied to the issue of an implied
warranty of habitability, those sources which the Alexander court should
have taken note of were the common law background, as well as the con-
gressional purpose for entering the housing field.
A. The Common Law Background
There was no implied warranty of habitability at common law. The
common law considered a lease a conveyance of an interest in real prop-
erty." The primary purpose of the lease was agricultural; any building or
dwelling upon the land was considered incidental." A lease was viewed as
the transfer of a freehold interest and as such there was no implied war-
ranty that the premises conveyed were fit for any particular use. The ten-
ant, as a purChaser of an estate in land, took the premises as they were,"
and was responsible for their upkeep and repair. He was protected by his
right to inspect the premises to determine for himself their condition and
suitability." This rule of caveat emptor, settled as of 1485, 69 was of minor
concern to the pre-industrial, agrarian tenant because of his right to inspect
and because the relative simplicity of design of the dwelling meant that he
had the ability, skill and resources to repair it. 79
"" See Clearfield Trust Co. v, United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (federal general
common law developed under Swift v. Tyson termed a convenient source of reference for
fashioning federal rules). Swill v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), stands for the proposition
that the rule of decision in diversity actions is federal general common law. Swift was later
overruled on this point by Erie.
59 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
"See Moore v. United States 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 270, 273, 274 (1875) (Court derived rules
of evidence from the common law).
" Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5 (1972) (federal statutes "provide
useful guidelines in fashioning ... rules of decision"); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (federal laws must be fashioned from the policy of national labor
laws).
" Keydata Corp. v. United States, 504 F.2d 1115, 1122-23 (Ct. C1.1974).
" 3 Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1939) (Court
chose the rule that it found best comported with general notions of equity while also taking
into consideration public convenience).
94
 Keydata Corp. v. United States, 504 F.2d 1115, 1122 (1974),
95 See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11, at 202-03 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
" Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, 517 1'.2d 1168, 1172, 1 1 l Cal Rptr.
704, 708 (1974).
" 7 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 at 267 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
" Id.
"" Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.30 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
7° Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or Strict Liability,
1975 Wisc. L. REv, 19, 28. This state of the common law was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Viterbro v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707 (1887). Viterbro involved premises which were
rendered unfit by flooding for the use contemplated by the parties when they executed the
lease. In dictum, the Court pointed out that under the common law there is no implied cov-
enant that the premises are fit for the purpose for which they are let. Id. at 712.
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This concept of a lease as an interest in land developed in an agrar-
ian society. The right to possession itself was the chief element of the ex-
change." However, as the industrial revolution sped the migration from
rural to urban areas, there was an increase in the importance of structural
improvements and a corresponding decrease in the significance of the land
to which the premises were attached. 72 Tenants came to occupy structures
that were no longer as simple as those in rural areas. Because the increas-
ing complexity of modern dwellings required both expertise and resources
in order to make necessary repairs, urban tenants found themselves de-
creasingly capable of making such repairs." Property law, however, failed
to keep pace with these changing conditions. The tenant continued to take
the premises as they were and the landlord remained under no obligation
to repair.
This traditional view of the landlord-tenant relationship continued de-
spite the recognition that the modern lease more nearly resembles a con-
tract than a conveyance." The modern urban lease involves space in a
building; its value to the tenant is its furnishing of a place to live. It has be-
come increasingly divorced from the land itself. The landlord's duties to
the tenant no longer end once possession is delivered but continue and in-
clude such contractual services as utilities and maintenance." The modern
tenant is less concerned with the bare right to possession than he is with
such goods and services as heat, light, electricity, plumbing, sanitation and
security. That the modern lease is essentially contractual in nature has be-
come increasingly recognized by both state and federal courts."
Recently, several state courts have been called upon to analyze the ra-
tionale behind the rule of caveat emptor and have determined that it was
never intended to apply to urban residential leases." favins v. First National
Realty Corp.," which dealt with residential leases in the District of Colum-
bia, is the leading case dealing with this issue. Its rationale for the adoption
" Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 189, 293 N.E.2d 831, 837
(1973).
" Old Town De•. Co. v. Langford, — lnd. App. —, —, 349 N.E.2d 744, 755
(1976).
" Love, supra note 70, at 28.
" Schoshinski, supra note 44, at 535; C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL
PRomicry 70 (2d ed. 1962). TI -Jhe modern lease is a highly complex instrument in which the
contract element is a substantial, if not the predominant, ingredient." Id.
Schoshinski, supra note 44, at 535.
'6
 See state cases in note 17 supra; federal cases in notes 45 & 46 supra. A contractual
approach led to two common law exceptions to the rule of caveat emptor. First, an implied
warranty of habitability is read into short term leases of furnished premises on the ground
that the parties intended for an immediate entry and the tenant does not have the opportun-
ity for inspection. Ingalls v. Hobhs, 156 Mass. 348, 351, 31 N.E. 286, 287 (1892); Young v.
Povich, 121 Me. 141, 144, 116 A. 26, 27 (1922). Second, where leases are executed when the
premises are under construction there is an implied warranty that the property will be suited
for the purpose for which it was leased. Woo!ford v. Electra Appliances, 24 Cal. App. 2d 385,
391, 75 P.2d 112, 114 (1938); Hardman Estate v. McNair, 61 Wash. 74, 77, 111  P. 1059, 1061
(1910).
" Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). "[T]he old common law rule imposing an obligation upon the lessee to repair
during the lease term was really never intended to apply to residential urban lease-holds." See
cases cited in note 17 supra.
"428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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of the warranty, widely followed by the states, can be taken as representing
a general statement of the desirability of the rule."
The facts in Javins were relatively simple. The landlord instituted an
action for possession of rented premises on the ground that tenants had
not paid rent. Tenants conceded that they had failed to pay rent but
alleged numerous housing code violations as a set-off equal to the rent
claim.H°
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that. the rule of caveat emptor should be abandoned in favor of
an implied warranty of habitability. The court pointed out that its holding
reflected a belief that urban leases should be interpreted and construed like
any other contract. The court found support for its holding in both the
common law" and the local housing code."
In particular, three reasons were articulated by the court. in support
of its conclusion that the common law rule should be changed. First, the
rule was based on factual assumptions no longer true. The court. found
that urban tenants are interested not in the land but in a habitable dwell-
ing." Further, modern tenants, unlike their agrarian predecessors, are no
longer able to repair their premises themselves. The modern urban tenant
possesses neither the skill, equipment nor funds to make complex repairs.
Second, the court found that the development of consumer protection law,
by which sellers are held impliedly to warrant that their goods are fit for
the use intended by the parties, should be extended into the landlord-
tenant area." The relationship between landlord and tenant has become
increasingly similar to that between the buyer and seller of goods. Just as
the buyer of goods must rely on his seller's good faith as to the quality of
goods purchased, so too must the tenant rely on his landlord's assertions of
housing quality. The third reason cited by the Javins court for abandoning
the common law rule concerned the urban housing market. The court
took cognizance of the housing shortage and the subsequent inequality of
bargaining power that has resulted in tenants having little leverage for en-
forcing demands for better housing." The court reasoned that its decision
could be based as well on the presence of a local housing code which it
treated as the enactment of a legislative policy placing the landlord under a
duty to repair."
The fourteen other courts that have adopted the rule of implied war-
ranty have done so for substantially the same reasons as those articulated in
Javins. 87
 Of the courts that have addressed the issue only two of seventeen
" Courts considering the issue of implied warranty have quoted freely from the Javins
opinion'. See Jack Spring Inc. v. Little, 50 III.2d 351, 363-66, 280 N.E.2d 208, 215-17 (1972);
Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, — Ind. App. —, —, 349 N.E.2d 794, 756-57 (1976);
Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 197-98, 293 N.E.2d 831, 842 (1973);
Foisy v. Wyman, 82 Wash. 2d 22, 26-27, 515 P.2d 160, 163-64 (1973).
8° 428 F.2d at 1073.
" Id, at 1075-77.




80 1d. at 1080.
" See cases listed in note 17 supra. Alexander is the first federal court case to consider
the issue of an implied warranty of habitability in federal residential leases. However, a federal
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have refused to imply a warranty of habitability into residential leases."
Moreover, one of the two rejecting the rule appeared to favor its adoption
but regarded the establishment of such a warranty as a legislative deci-
sion." The fact that sixteen of seventeen courts which recently have ad-
dressed the issue have favored the implication of a warranty of habitability
leads to the conclusion that this is the current direction of legal thinking.
While these court decisions are in no way binding, they do serve to inform
the federal judiciary of the rule that is currently most favored by courts
addressing the issue.9° Thus while the rule of caveat emptor was the rec-
ognized common law rule of the past, it seems to have lost its vigor under
modern circumstances. The trend of the last decade clearly has been in
favor of establishing an implied warranty of habitability. 9 '
B. The Legislative Background
In addition to the common law background, federal courts are guided
by legislative intent and policy in fashioning rules of federal common law."
Federal statutes are the starting point in this process. 93 Specifically, federal
district court has held that there is an implied warranty of habitability in the .sale of HUD
housing. City of Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The court found that
the buyers
justifiably relied on the expertise of HUD as being able to recondition a home
that would be fit for human habitation. In fact we feel that [they] ... are entitled
to expect more from their own Government than they are from a seller dealing
at arm's length. HUD is not selling houses for profit, but rather to provide "a de-
cent home ... for every American family." By affirming the existence of an im-
plied warranty of habitability, this Court is confirming [their] ... trust in their
own government to do what it promised, and to carry out its statutory goals.
363 F. Supp. at 154 (citations omitted).
68
 Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 349-50, 294 A.2d 321, 325 (1972) (no implied war-
ranty of habitability in Connecticut leases); Blackwell v. Del Bosco, — Colo. —, —, 558
P.2d 563, 565 (1976) (implication of a warranty left to the Colorado legislature).
" Blackwell v. Del Bosco, — Colo. —, 558 P.2d 563, 565 (1976). The Col-
orado Supreme Court decided that however desirable the rule might be, the resolution of the
issue is more properly the function of the legislature.
90 The Seventh Circuit in Alexander was cognizant of this influence. The court pointed
out, however, that while a state's standards are relevant they are not conclusive as a source of
federal common law. 555 F.2d at 171 n.5. The court expressly declined to follow state court
decisions on this issue.
Other sources which have influenced the federal judiciary in fashioning rules of federal
common law also support an implied warranty. The Keydata court extensively relied on the
Restatement of Property to fashion the federal rule in that situation. 504 F.2d at 112. The Re-
statement of Property notes with approval the recent trend to place upon the landlord the re-
sponsibility to provide the tenant with property in a condition suitable for the use con-
templated by the parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note to Chapter 5
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974). England, where the rule of caveat emptor originated, has also
adopted a warranty of habitability for residential leases. Housing Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, C.
65, II 32.
°' See cases cited in note 17 supra. See generally Blumberg and Robinson, Beyond ULRTA:
A Program for Achieving Real Tenant Goals, 11 HARV, C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I (1976); Moshkovitz,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1444
(1974).
92 See cases cited in note 61 supra.
"See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). See also Mish-
kin, supra note 21, at 811.
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housing statutes are the focal point of the inquiry as to congressional intent
with respect to the implication of a warranty of habitability in HUD hous-
i ng.
Congress has been involved in providing housing to families of low
income since the enactment of the Housing Act of 1937." It was at that
time that Congress first articulated its policy of alleviating the shortage of
decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families of low income." The im-
portance of this goal was restated by Congress in passing the Housing Act
of 1949." Congress declared at that time that the elimination of sub-
standard housing would improve the general welfare and would contribute
to the advancement of the growth, wealth and security of the nation."
Two decades later, Congress passed the Housing and Urban De-
velopment Act of 1968 which explicitly reaffirmed the housing policy of
the 1949 Act." In considering the legislation, Congress determined that
although there had been many accomplishments, national housing goals
still had not been met." 9 This was found to be a matter of grave national
concern.'" In 1974 Congress once again reiterated its concern that na-
tional housing goals be met.'"
Thus for forty years Congress consistently has established as a goal of
national policy a decent home for every American family. Congress has
stated on several occasions the importance of this goal and its concern that
it is not being met. Thus in looking at this legislation as a whole, it. is clear
that Congress has manifested a deep and long-lasting concern with respect
to the deteriorating state of this nation's housing stock and its effect upon
the populace. Hence, any interpretation or enforcement of these laws
should reflect the nature and extent of this concern.
In determining the responsibility of the government as . lessee, the
Alexander court was faced with the decision of determining whether the rule
of caveat emptor or an implied warranty of habitability better comports
with articulated congressional policy in the area of housing. The court
should have, but did not, determine whether placing an affirmative con-
tractual obligation upon the government to repair low income dwellings in
its possession would further the congressional goal of a safe, decent home
for every American family. Rather, the court avoided the issue of how best
to effectuate explicit congressional goals, preferring instead to defer to pos-
sible future congressional action.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
" See note 15 supra for text of this policy.
"42 U.S.C. 1441 (1970). The Senate Committee report noted that ''the general welfare
and security of the Nation requires the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent
home and a suitable living environment for every American family." S. Rm.. No. 84, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess„ reprinted in [1949] U.S. CODE CONG. & Al). NEws 1550, 1559.
97
 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
99 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1970).
" H.R. REP. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. reprinted in [1968] U.S. Cont: Cos:, & An.
NEWS 2873, 2873. "Since the declaration ... that our national objective was 'a decent home
and a suitable living environment lire every American family,' our country has invested heavily
in the production of housing . Mhese accomplishments , have fallen far short of today's
needs."
I" H.R. RE'. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. reprinted in [1968) U.S. Corso-: CONG. & An.
NEWS 2873, 2877. "Congress finds that the goal [of national housing policy] has not been fully
realized ... and states that this is a matter of grave national concern." Id.
'U 1
 42 U.S.C. § 1441a(a) (Stipp. IV 1974).
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III. TOWARDS A FEDERAL IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Since federal courts can develop common law rules in controversies
arising out of contractual relationships between private individuals and the
federal government, and since Congress has not legislated on the issue of
repairs, the Alexander court was free to fashion a federal rule of common
law vis-a-vis caveat emptor. In determining whether to adopt an implied
warranty as plaintiffs urged, the court should have looked to common law
developments and legislative intent and policy in the relevant statutory
scheme.
Javins illustrates the weight and persuasiveness of the common law
development in the field. Its three-pronged analysis for establishing a war-
ranty of habitability: 102
 I) common law assumptions have changed, 2) con-
sumer protection developments should apply to tenants and 3) housing
shortages have resulted in unequal bargaining positions—seems to be
equally applicable to the federal government as to private landlords.
The first point raised by Javins is that the factual assumptions made
by the common law are no longer valid. These assumptions, that the ten-
ant's primary interest is the land and that tenants are able to make their
own repairs, are no more true for public sector tenants than for tenants in
the private sector. Thus, the observation that the interest in land is far
outweighed by the tenant's interest in occupying a habitable dwelling seems
especially true when dealing with government tenants who occupy one of
approximately 147 apartment units in a twelve-story building as was the
case in Alexander.'" Repairs of a building this size seem to fit exactly into
the concept of a complex dwelling, difficult, costly and nearly impossible
for the average low income tenant to repair. 10" If repairs to such a building
are to be made, they can only be expected to be made by the landlord.
HUD tenants are therefore subject to the same common law change in cir-
cumstances that has led the state courts to abandon the rule of caveat
emptor.
Consumer protection developments, the second point raised by Javins,
are based on the recognition that the buyer of goods and services in an in-
dustrial society must rely upon the skill and honesty of the supplier to as-
sure that goods and services purchased are of adequate quality."' This re-
liance was cited by the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as the basis for an implication of a warranty of habitability
in the sale of HUD housing.'" The district court found that the buyer is
entitled to expect more from the government by way of housing quality
than he would from a private sector seller.'" This reliance on the govern-
ment is even more pronounced where the government is the landlord of a
"2 See text at notes 83-85 supra.
"3 555 F.2d at 167.
13-1 Remedying the conditions of Riverhouse was obviously beyond the ability of any
tenant. The elevators, plumbing and electrical and heating systems were defective. Id. at 167-
68. The court in Javins refers to repairs of exactly this type when it discussed the problems
which can arise in modern dwellings, problems that only the lessor is in a position to remedy.
428 F.2d at 1078-79.
"5 428 F.2d at 1075.
100 City of Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148, 154 (E.D. Pa. 1973), motion to vacate




large apartment complex and low income families are the tenants. Inspec-
tion before entry is meaningless because the ability to assess a large com-
plex building's physical and mechanical suitability is beyond the capability
of the average tenant's knowlege and financial means. Low income tenants
of large complexes such as Riverhouse have no choice but to rely on the
expertise and good faith of HUD as their landlord. Hence, the rationale of
consumer protection decisions strongly suggests that the government, as a
dealer in rental housing, impliedly warrants that the housing it provides is
fit for the use intended.
The final reason articulated in favins for the change in the common
law, market shortages, is equally applicable to HUD housing built for low
income tenants as it is to private sector housing. 1 ° 8 The perception of the
tenant as being at the "mercy of the market-place" is especially apt with re-
gard to those low income tenants occupying buildings built precisely be-
cause there is a shortage of good housing for people in the low income
bracket. HUD tenants, as much as other tenants in the private marketplace,
certainly have "little leverage" in enforcing demands for better housing.
Like the tenants described in favins, the tenants of HUD are in a "take it or
leave it" situation.
Thus, all of the factors listed by favins as reasons fdr changing the
common law relationship between landlord and tenant with respect to the
issue of a warranty of habitability in the private sector can be applied to
government housing in the public sector. The assumptions upon which the
old common law rule was based are no longer valid for urban residential
tenants. The rationale behind consumer protection developments, based on
the buyer's reliance on his seller's expertise, is applicable to landlord-tenant
relations. Finally, the housing shortage which has left tenants devoid of
either bargaining power or choice is as relevant in government housing as
it is in private housing.
Articulated congressional policy is another source on which the
Alexander court could have relied in fashioning a federal common law rule
concerning an implied warranty of habitability. The stated congressional
purpose of the housing legislation throughout the years indicates a con-
gressional intent that HUD tenants be given a habitable environment in
which to live. The rule of caveat emptor is at odds with this intent in that
substandard housing conditions would thereby be allowed to continue
without government obligation to correct them.
The Housing Acts were enacted precisely because there is a shortage
of decent housing and because Congress believed that this condition was
detrimental to the nation's well-being. It is unlikely that Congress would in-
tend that a program designed to alleviate shortages of decent housing
would provide tenants with housing which is below accepted standards of
habitability. Rather, the stated congressional purpose behind these acts
strongly suggests that HUD should be placed under an affirmative obliga-
tion to meet minimum standards of fitness.'"
16" 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). The Act is directed to families of low income. The lack of
choice in the market place would appear to be hardest felt by those with the smallest incomes.
10" It is presently undecided whether local housing code standards are applicable to
HUD. However, the courts which have considered the issue have found that, at the least, local
codes constitute a point of reference for giving content and meaning to the standard of "de-
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It is at this point that - the legislative intent and the common law de-
velopment in the states converge. Congress intended to provide good hous-
ing for low income families. The states, both in the courts and the legisla 7
tures, have determined that an effective way to guarantee decent housing is
to imply a warranty of habitability into residential leases. Thus, although
Congress has remained silent on this point, the common law development
illustrates that articulated legislative policy can best be effectuated by the
implication of a warranty of habitability. While the Alexander court pre-
ferred to leave the decision to the Congress, it is arguable that Congress al-
ready has spoken in favor of such a warranty through its statements of
purpose in the various Housing Acts.
The Seventh Circuit considered neither the common law background
nor the intent behind the congressional legislation in reaching its decision
in Alexander. Rather, the court decided that the implication of such a war-
ranty was not a judicial function. The court reasoned that since a warranty
of habitability would serve as a warranty that "stated objectives of national
policy have been and are being met," only Congress was empowered to
create such a warranty."° This result was reached despite the general rec-
ognition that leases with the government are construed in the same man-
ner as contracts with the government, that government contracts are in-
terpreted according to federal common law as developed by the courts and
that federal courts have long implied terms into such contracts so as to
create governmental liability.'"
Furthermore, the court of appeals apparently overstated the ramifica-
tions of an implied warranty of habitability. Such a warranty is not a war-
ranty that the shortage of good housing will be remedied. Rather it is a
warranty that the housing that is provided by the government will meet
minimum standards of habitability. It would place upon HUD, as upon any
other landlord, an affirmative•obligation to make repairs, an obligation not
heretofore imposed. This warranty would not guarantee that all poor
families will be provided with decent housing but rather would place a con-
tractual obligation upon the government in purporting to provide such
housing to meet minimal standards of habitability. Where HUD does not
meet that obligation, the tenant would have a contractual remedy similar to
that of any other person injured by breach of contract.' 12
cent, safe and sanitary housing" in the National housing act. Knox Hill Tenant's Council v.
Lynn, 448 F.2d 1045, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Coleman v. United States, 311 A.2d 496, 497-98
(D.C. 1973). Cf. Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1368 (3rd Cir. 1974) (local codes apply to
the sale of HUD housing); 24 C.F.R. § 221.545(c) (1977) (HUD financed property must com-
ply with all applicable building and other governmental regulations; however, this regulation
refers to property insured by HUD and may not be applicable where HUD is the actual title
owner).
"° 555 F.2d at 171.
"' See text at notes 43-52 and note 54 supra.
" 2
 Tenant's have been granted such contractual remedies as termination, damages, rent
abatement, rent application and rent withholdings in situations in which a court has de-
termined that a landlord has breached an implied warranty of habitability. 1 AMERICAN LAW




An implied warranty of habitability recognizes that if premises are to
be in a state of good repair, it is the landlord who must have the obligation
to repair them. The considerations outlined above indicate that such an ob-
ligation should apply to HUD as landlord in the same way that it in-
creasingly has been applied to private landlords. It is therefore submitted
that there is a need for a uniform federal rule regarding federally owned
housing and that the rule which best effectuates congressional policy is that
of an implied warranty of habitability. The implication of a warranty of
habitability is not a guarantee that federal housing policy goals are being
met but rather is a rule which alters the common law duty to repair and
grants to tenants a contractual remedy where the premises are below
minimum standards of fitness. The Seventh Circuit in Alexander should not
have deferred a decision to Congress but instead should have decided the
issue presented on the merits and held that there is an implied warranty of
habitability in HUD housing. Since it seems inappropriate that tenants of
the federal government should be afforded fewer rights than those tenants
who have contracted in the private sector, the federal courts should adopt
as a uniform rule of federal common law an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity in urban residential leases where the United States is the lessor.
DAVID A. SLACTER
Federal Gift Taxation of Non-Interest-Bearing Loans: Crown v.
Cornmisaioner'—Lester Crown and his two brothers were equal partners
in Areljay Company, an Illinois general partnership. 2 Prior to 1967,
twenty-four trusts benefiting children and other relatives of' the Areljay
partners were established and funded in part by the partners. 3 During
1967, Areljay made various non-interest-bearing loans to the trusts so that
by December 31, the trusts owed Areljay a total of $18,030,024, all of
which were recorded in the books of Areljay and the respective debtor
trusts, and were payable on demand. 4 Throughout 1967, interest was
neither due nor paid on any of these loans.'
In 1974, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) is-
sued a notice of deficiency, claiming that Crown owed $46,084.54 in addi-
tional gift tax for 1967.4 The Commissioner alleged that the deficiency
' 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. Sept. 2, 1977).
Id.
3 Id. at 1061. In 1967, the Areljay partners had a total of 15 children, separate trusts
for 12 of whom were involved in Crown. Harry N. Wyatt was the sole trustee of all the trusts.
Id. All were evidenced either by demand notes or by open account entries in Areljay's
records. No interest was charged on any of the open account loans. The demand notes simi-
larly required no payment of interest before demand, but did call for six percent interest after
demand. As of December 31, 1967, loans represented by demand notes totaled $2,073,649
and loans on open account totaled $15,956,375.
5 /d. at 1060. At all pertinent times, Areljay, its partners, and all of the trusts have op-
erated on the cash basis method of accounting. During 1967, the market prime rate of interest
ranged between live and one-half percent and six percent per annum, averaging 5.63 percent..
"Id,
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